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Summary 
This paper uses information from an ad-hoc module on disability in the 2002 UK Labour 
Force Survey to identify the heterogeneity that exists within the disabled group and examine 
its impact on labour market outcomes. After controlling for a range of personal 
characteristics, the type, severity, duration and cause of the disability are found to be 
important determinants of employment, but there is less evidence to support the influence of 
within group heterogeneity on earnings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Whilst international evidence that compares labour market outcomes between 
disabled and non-disabled individuals has grown rapidly (see Kidd et al., 2000,
Madden, 2004 and Jones et al., 2006 for UK evidence), less attention has been paid to 
heterogeneity within the disabled group and its implications for labour market 
outcomes. However, the features of disability that differentiate it from empirical 
analysis of gender and ethnicity, such as it being a limitation rather than a 
characteristic and its fluid nature give rise to potential dramatic heterogeneity within 
the disabled group. Even the most obvious within group differences, such as in the 
type and severity of an impairment may be expected to impact work productivity, 
non-work income, the disutility of work and discrimination. Thus, it is likely that 
these features are fundamental in the analysis of labour market outcomes of the 
disabled. Indeed, there has been a longstanding recognition of the policy importance 
of this issue, with Baldwin and Johnson (1994), stating ‘the success of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act may depend on the extent to which the implementation of its 
policies recognises the differences among persons with disabilities and among types 
of impairments’ p14. Moreover, this issue has been more recently emphasized again 
in the UK by Berthoud (2003).  
 
Despite this, studies consistently split the population into two or more sub groups and 
identify the disadvantage associated with disability as if it were homogeneous.1 This 
is, in part, a result of restrictions imposed by data availability and the widespread 
application of standard decomposition techniques. Therefore, most studies have 
provided limited information with respect to questions such as which features of the 
disability give rise to the disadvantage? This is not only an important question in its 
own right, but may provide additional insights into the processes that determine the 
disadvantage of the entire group. Furthermore, as Silverstein et al. (2005) note, the 
failure to account for within group diversity may lead to misleading inferences in 
comparisons between groups.  
 
1 There remains significant debate about the most appropriate definition of disability and average 
employment rates vary considerably by definition (Berthoud, 2003).  
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A limited number of recent UK studies have begun to consider individual aspects of 
heterogeneity including the effect of the severity of the disability (Berthoud, 2003), 
the type of disability (Kidd et al., 2000 and Jones et al., 2006) and, using longitudinal 
data, the duration of the disability (Jenkins and Rigg, 2004 and Burchardt, 2003). 
However, restrictions on data availability have limited a more comprehensive analysis 
of heterogeneity. 
 
This paper, by exploiting additional questions introduced in the UK Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) as part of an ad hoc module on the employment of disabled people, is 
able to consider several forms of heterogeneity of a disability simultaneously and 
examine their implications for both employment and labour market earnings.2
Importantly, these data also contain information, including the cause of the disability, 
which has not been previously examined in the UK. Whether the disability stems from 
an accident or illness, if it is work-related or if an individual was born with their 
disability has potentially important labour market implications. For example, an 
individual may receive compensation from an injury at work which is likely to raise 
his/her reservation wage. Moreover, onset at birth or in childhood will affect pre-
labour market experiences, entry to the labour market and an individual’s entire 
labour market history (see Baldwin and Johnson, 2001).  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. A concise review of previous 
evidence relating to different forms of heterogeneity is given in Section 2. Section 3 
then considers the advantages of using this data and outlines the econometric 
methodology. Section 4 presents the key results before the final section briefly 
concludes. 
 
2 The module was introduced in the European Labour Force Survey to provide comparable information 
on the labour market situation of people with disabilities in the EU in preparation for the 2003 
European Year of People with Disabilities (see Dupre and Karjalainen, 2003). 
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2. Empirical Evidence 
 
Studies which analyse the labour market impact of disability virtually always control 
for observable personal, household, regional and, sometimes, employment related 
characteristics. However, the differences within the disabled group that are generated 
by observable features of the impairment, referred to throughout as heterogeneity, are 
frequently neglected. There are some exceptions. For example, studies that use self-
reported information confirm the negative effect of disability on labour market 
performance increases with severity (see Hale et al. 1998 for US evidence and Hum 
and Simpson, 1996 for evidence relating to Canada) and with the number of 
impairments (Hum and Simpson, 1996), consistent with the negative influence on 
productivity. Berthoud (2003) uses more ‘objective’ measures of severity from the 
Disability Survey, which formed an extension of the UK Family Resources Survey in 
1996/7, and confirms the negative association between severity and employment. 
More ‘objective’ measures of health have also been included in several US studies on 
earnings, although the focus has been to control for productivity differences rather 
than examine the heterogeneity itself (Baldwin and Johnson, 1994, 1995, 2000 and 
Schumacher and Baldwin, 2000). The type of impairment can also affect labour 
market outcomes through a productivity and/or discrimination effect. The UK 
evidence suggests that those with mental health problems face the most severe labour 
market disadvantage (Blackaby et al., 1999, Kidd et al., 2000 and Jones et al., 2006).  
 
The fluid nature of disability gives rise to dynamic sources of heterogeneity and 
longitudinal data analysis in the UK has identified a negative employment effect 
associated with the duration of a disability (Jenkins and Rigg, 2004), although the 
process through which this operates is less clear. Whilst there are advantages of using 
longitudinal data in this context, this approach also has certain limitations. The 
duration measure is censored from both directions and is, therefore, constrained by the 
length of the panel. This is limited to a single year in the LFS used by Burchardt 
(2003) and, although this increases to six years in the Jenkins and Rigg (2004) 
analysis of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the number of individuals 
who experienced disability onset was limited at 280. Importantly, these studies only 
consider disability onset among adults and, hence, ignore the potentially different role 
of disability onset prior to labour market entry. 
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The ad hoc module on disability considered here also contains information relating to 
the cause of disability, which has received less consideration. However, the nature of 
onset may also have important labour market implications. Baldwin and Johnson 
(2001) highlight that individuals who are disabled at birth may be limited in terms of 
education, face pre labour market discrimination and their disability may affect their 
entire labour market experience. Individuals who experience age onset disability will 
face a different set of labour market issues, including retaining employment and 
promotion opportunities. In contrast, Loprest and Maag (2007) and Wilkins (2004), in 
the only known international studies to examine this issue, find, using cross sectional 
data from the US and Australia respectively, that early disability onset has a positive 
effect on employment relative to older disability onset. Both studies suggest that this 
is a result of adaptation. Wilkins (2004) argues that disabled youths will have more 
time and greater incentives to adapt to the disability and Loprest and Maag (2007) add 
that disabled children can choose careers in which their disability can be more easily 
accommodated.  
 
It is not only the heterogeneity of the disability itself that has potentially important 
labour market implications; the impact of the disability will depend on the 
environment in which an individual is situated (Silverstein et al. 2005). Important 
influences may include the availability of medical care, the attitudes of others and 
government policies and legislation. Probably the most significant influence in this 
respect is the availability of an alternative source of income through the benefit 
system. Since one quarter of the UK population with a long-term health problem is in 
receipt of some type of disability or sickness benefit, this creates a crucial difference 
within the disabled group, with obvious implications for work incentives. Another 
significant change, that arises from the introduction of the Disability Discrimination 
Act (DDA) in 1995, is the obligation on employers to make reasonable adjustment to 
their premises and employment arrangements to facilitate and enhance the access to 
employment for the disabled. The effects on employment and earnings are not clear. 
While access to employment and productivity in work should increase, the additional 
cost induced by these accommodations may reduce the employment of disabled 
workers (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001) and/or result in employers passing these costs 
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on to disabled workers in terms of a pay penalty (Baldwin and Johnson, 2001).3 In the 
UK, however, the Access to Work scheme provides financial support for employers 
when making such modifications, which should limit the negative impact of this 
requirement of the legislation. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 The Data  
This study uses additional questions introduced in an ad hoc EU module on disability 
in the Spring 2002 Quarter of the UK LFS. Whilst the data are limited to a single 
cross section, they contain important retrospective information on the duration and 
cause of disability; this is in addition to questions relating to the severity and type of 
the disability that are included every quarter. Importantly, therefore, this additional 
information, combined with the scale of the LFS, means multiple aspects of 
heterogeneity can be examined simultaneously. The retrospective nature of the 
additional information means, however, that it may suffer from recall error. While the 
bounded nature of the responses to duration, particularly the upper bound group of ‘10 
years or more’, should reduce this effect it also limits the accuracy of this control. 
Fortunately, information about the cause of the disability includes a control for ‘at 
birth’; however, hereditary conditions which may only become limiting in later life 
are also included in this group.  
 
3.2 Employment  
The econometric methodology modifies previous analysis of the impact of disability 
on employment and earnings (Kidd et al., 2000, Madden, 2004 and Jones et al., 2006) 
to focus on within rather than between group differences. This emphasis means the 
sample is restricted to individuals of working age who self-report a long-term health 
problem4. Full-time students are also excluded from the analysis. Employment 
 
3 Gunderson and Hyatt (1996) consider the impact on earnings using a specialized dataset from Ontario 
in the early 1980s. They find that the proportion of the cost of the accommodation passed on to workers 
is higher if they are injured at another firm. 
4 The additional questions relating to the duration, cause and severity of the disability were only asked 
to those with a long-term health problem. Those with a long-term health problem represent 28% of the 
male working age sample and 27% of the respective female sample. Whilst this definition does not 
coincide with more standard work limiting or DDA definitions, it maximises the number of 
observations for the analysis and considers the entire heterogeneity within the broadest definition of 
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equations are modelled empirically using probit models and are estimated separately 
by gender: 
 
iiii XYE µ ++=
* (1) 
 
where the observed variable iE is related to the latent variable 
*
iE as follows:
5
iE =


 >
ise otherw
 if E*i
0
01
iY contains personal and household related characteristics including age, 
qualifications, ethnicity, marital status, the presence of dependent children, region of 
residence and housing tenure (see Table 1 for variable definitions). However, these 
variables are supplemented with a range of controls relating to the nature of the 
disability, iX . Conditional on there being correlation between the included and 
omitted variables, the significance of ˆ would indicate that estimates based on a 
model without controls for within group differences will suffer from omitted variable 
bias.  
 
Variables that should be included in iX are less well established, but can be separated 
into cross sectional and more dynamic influences. In this model, controls for cross 
sectional forms of heterogeneity include four classifications for the type of main 
health problem, namely, limbs, sight and hearing, chest and breathing and mental 
health (the base group is other), variables that capture self-reported measures of 
severity (restrictions on the kind and amount of work, and mobility restrictions) and a 
control for individuals with multiple health problems.6 An additional specification is 
 
disability. It is reassuring to note that the main conclusions are robust to restricting the sample to 
alternative (work-limiting or DDA) definitions of disability. 
5 Employment is defined using ILO definitions in the LFS and therefore includes, employees, the self 
employed, those on government training schemes and unpaid family workers. The non-employed 
include both the unemployed and the inactive.  
6 These variables all relate to the current period and therefore no information is available on how the 
severity or type of disability has changed over time. The impact of the duration of disability may 
depend on the severity at onset and how severity changes over time, however, no information is 
available to control for this.  
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8
also estimated with a control for the receipt of incapacity or any other sickness related 
benefit, since, otherwise, the controls for heterogeneity may partially capture this 
influence.  
 
A series of dummy variables relating to the duration of the disability are included, 
ranging from durations of ‘less than one year’ to ‘ten years or more’. A continuous 
measure of duration would capture the difference in the reward to experience in the 
presence of a disability. A lower return may be expected if the presence of a disability 
limits labour market experience and training, relative to a period without a disability. 
Hence, it is anticipated that those at long durations may face the most labour market 
disadvantage. However, controlling only for duration assumes that the impact of a 
disability is constant across the lifecycle. As discussed above, the impact of disability 
may also depend on the source and timing of onset. A series of dummy variables are 
included to capture the cause of the disability, which includes a control for ‘at birth’. 
Whilst differences in observable characteristics that result from the cause of disability 
(for example, education) will be captured by the controls in iY , the variables relating 
to the cause will capture the direct influence on labour market outcomes. For example, 
differences in the ability to adapt on the basis of age of onset will be captured by the 
control for ‘at birth’. 
 
There are some limitations in introducing dynamic concepts in cross sectional 
analysis, which have been emphasised in evidence relating to the assimilation of 
immigrants.7 Borjas (1985) argues that cross sectional estimates of the impact of the 
duration of residence in the home country on earnings will be affected by selection 
effects and will include the influence of changes in cohort quality. Similar arguments 
can be made in the context of disability. A selection problem occurs if labour market 
success increases the probability of exiting disability, resulting in those with inferior 
labour market outcomes being concentrated at long durations of disability. The 
justification hypothesis argues that there are incentives for non-employed individuals 
to over-report disability; however, there appears to be less incentive to relate exits 
from disability to labour market outcomes. The cohort effect will exist if there is a 
change in unobserved quality across time. For example, if unobserved quality has 
 
7 All the models are also estimated without the controls for the dynamic influences (duration and cause) 
but the results are not sensitive to this. 
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9
deteriorated across time, those at long durations will have higher unobserved quality 
which will lead to an underestimate of the impact of duration.8
Sample Selection Bias 
Since equation (1) can only be estimated on the disabled population, this creates a 
potential problem of sample selection bias. This arises if there are common 
unobservables which affect disability and employment, for example motivation or 
preferences for work. A bivariate probit model with selection into disability status is 
estimated to test the sensitivity of the results from the probit model. At the first stage a 
model of disability status is estimated where the propensity to self report disability 
(Di*) is given by: 
 
iii vTD +=

* (2) 
 
However, only the binary indicator is observed: 
 


 >
=
,0
0
1 *i
i
D
otherwise
if
D
And, at the second stage, the employment equation (1) is estimated conditional on 
disability being observed ( 1=iD ). Given the nature of the information available in 
the LFS, the determinants of disability, iT , are restricted to personal and household 
characteristics. As such, the characteristics included in iT are largely the same as the 
characteristics in iY . While identification can be achieved in this model through 
functional form alone, following Madden (2004), identification is achieved by 
controlling for the presence of another disabled individual in the household in the 
disability, but not the employment equation.9 It is assumed that iµ and iv are 
 
8 Changes in the benefit regime, retirement and social norms may all give rise to cohort effects in this 
context. However, cohort effects cannot be identified without repeated cross sectional data. 
9 As expected, having another disabled individual in the household is a significant determinant of 
individual disability status, since it captures common lifestyle and environmental influences. It 
potentially could affect employment through the role of caring; however, the presence of another 
disabled member in the household is insignificant in a simple employment probit model. The 
sensitivity of the results is tested by using the presence of a previous long-term health problem for 
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distributed as bivariate normal with zero means, unit variances and that the correlation 
between the two errors is given by  . If unobservables affect both equations, the 
correlation will be non-zero ( 0)j  and, in this situation, the results from a simple 
probit model will be biased.  
 
Endogeneity 
Bound (1991) argues that self-reported information on health is subject to two sources 
of bias. The individual subjective nature of reporting will mean that responses may 
not be comparable across individuals, giving rise to measurement error. Some 
individuals may also have more incentive to misreport disability to justify non-
employment, which gives rise to justification bias.10 The same concerns may extend 
to questions involving whether disability affects the kind or amount of work among 
the disabled population, which are included as controls for heterogeneity. That is, 
conditional on disability, the non-employed may also have an incentive to over-report 
that their disability affects the type or amount of work they can do. Theoretically, 
these two sources of bias will influence the estimates of severity on labour market 
outcomes in opposite directions; measurement error will give rise to a downward bias, 
whereas justification bias will result in an overestimation of the impact on disability. 
It is difficult to find suitable instruments for the severity measures of disability in the 
LFS and, as such, it is not possible to test the exogeneity of these variables or examine 
the issue further here.11 
3.3 Earnings  
For a subset of employed disabled individuals, the log of hourly earnings ( )iW is also 
modelled as follows:  
 
identification. However, this information is only available for a subset of respondents. The results were 
not sensitive to the change in identification strategy. 
10 The evidence, however, is mixed. Several studies find that the non-employed tend to over-report ill-
health or disability (see, for example, Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995 and Kreider and Pepper, 2007) 
whilst others find that self-reported information is an unbiased measure of true health or disability (see, 
for example, Dwyer and Mitchell 1999 and Benitez-Silva et al. 2004).  
11 The variables included in 
iY and iZ are typical in the literature and are assumed to be exogenous. 
However, when examining the labour market impact of epilepsy, Famulari (1992) considers the 
endogeneity of education in an earnings equation and finds that failing to account for this endogeneity 
underestimates the impact of severity on earnings. 
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i
W
iii XZW  ++= (3) 
 
where iZ includes productivity related characteristics and a set of controls for the type 
of employment, such as industry, occupation and sector. The controls for 
heterogeneity, outlined previously, are supplemented with controls for working in 
sheltered employment and the receipt of assistance to help work in order to form WiX ;
however, the control for benefit income is excluded. 
 
There are, potentially, two sources of sample selection bias in the above equation, 
since individuals are both in employment and disabled. Three specifications of the 
earnings equation are estimated. Firstly, equation (3) is estimated by OLS. Secondly, 
estimates from an employment probit model are used to construct a selectivity 
correction term which is included in the earnings equation, following Heckman 
(1976). For identification, controls for the presence of dependent children, another 
income earner in the household and unemployment status 12 months ago are included 
in the employment equation but not the earnings equation.12 In the final specification, 
both sources of selection bias are modelled simultaneously. The estimates from the 
bivariate probit model outlined above are used to create two selection terms, as 
suggested by Tunali (1986), and these are included in the earnings equation. In this 
case, identification requires that there is at least one variable in each selection 
equation which is excluded from both the earnings equation and the other selection 
equation. As discussed above, the presence of a disabled household member is only 
included in the disability equation and, thus, fulfils this role. In the case of 
employment, the controls for dependent children and another earner in the household 
are significant determinants of disability and, therefore, it is the indicator of 
unemployment status 12 months ago that is included in the employment equation, not 
in the disability or earnings equations.13 
12 Information about earnings is only asked to employees in waves 1 and 5 of the LFS. The results from 
the selection equations are qualitatively similar to the employment equations above, but are not 
presented here. None of the identifying variables is significant in the simple earnings equation.  
13 For identification, these variables need to have a significant impact in their respective equation but 
no influence on earnings. All these variables are insignificant when included in a simple earnings 
equation. Unemployment 12 months ago is not significant at the 5% level in a simple probit model of 
disability status. Moreover, the key results are not sensitive to modifications of the exclusion 
restrictions, when the selection terms are created from two independent probit models or to estimation 
Page 11 of 41
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
12
4 Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the mean values for the variables used in the analysis for males and 
females respectively. Amongst those who are disabled, as defined by the presence of a 
long-term health problem, about 55% report they are limited in the kind of work they 
can do, about 45% find it affects the amount of work they can do and a third report 
difficulties getting to work due to their disability. In accordance with the work-
limiting definition of disability, 59% of men and 57% of women report a disability 
that affects either the type or amount of work they can do. Just less than half of those 
with a long-term health problem report more than one health problem. The most 
common type of main health problem for men is associated with back or neck (17%) 
or heart, blood pressure and circulation (17%), both slightly higher than chest or 
breathing (13%) or legs and feet (12%). 
 
Disability also varies in its permanency; about 45% of the disabled population have a 
disability that has lasted more than 10 years and an additional 20% have a disability 
lasting between 5 and 10 years. In terms of the cause of disability, 49% of men and 
63% of women have a disability caused by a non-work related disease or illness, but 
those whose disability occurred at birth comprise nearly 20% of the disabled 
population. About 3% of the disabled workers are employed in sheltered employment 
and, more surprisingly, even after several years of the DDA only 7% of those who 
need assistance in work actually receive it.  
 
4.2 Employment  
Tables 2 and 3 display the coefficients from the models of the determinants of 
employment for males and females respectively. In each case, the first set of estimates 
is from a simple probit model and the second set of estimates is from a bivariate 
probit model with sample selection. In both cases the initial specification, denoted (1), 
is then supplemented with disability benefit income in (2). The estimates from the 
probit and bivariate probit are qualitatively similar and  is not significantly different 
 
without the selection correction. Variables included in the wage but not the employment or disability 
equations (for example, industry) are defined only for the employed.  
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from zero at the 5% level in any specification.14 Therefore, the discussion largely 
focuses on the results from the probit models. 
 
The results of standard productivity related variables are in accordance with 
expectations and, therefore, the focus of the discussion relates to the controls for 
heterogeneity within the disabled group. A likelihood ratio test indicates the controls 
for within group differences are significant at the 1% level for both males and 
females. Indeed, for males the pseudo R squared in the probit model increases from 
0.26 to 0.50 with the inclusion of the within group controls, confirming their 
importance. Moreover, these features of disability are significant after the inclusion of 
a control for receipt of disability benefit income, which, consistent with the rules 
governing incapacity benefit receipt, has a strong negative effect on employment. 
 
Consistent with previous evidence in the UK (Berthoud, 2003) and elsewhere 
(Wilkins, 2004 and Loprest and Maag, 2007), information relating to the severity of 
the disability has a negative effect on the probability of employment. This influence 
remains important even after controlling for the type, duration and cause of the 
disability. The marginal effect of a disability which greatly affects mobility is 
particularly strong at 53% and 46% for males and females respectively, and is greater 
than the effect of limitations on either the kind or amount of work. In addition, for 
both genders, the number of recorded health problems has a significant negative effect 
on employment; one additional problem reduces the probability of employment by 
nearly 4.7% and 3.4% for males and females respectively, confirming the additional 
difficulty experienced by those with multiple health problems. The type of health 
problem is also important and, relative to the base group, individuals with mental 
health problems have a 22% lower probability of employment, which is consistent 
with previous UK evidence (Kidd et al., 2000 and Jones et al. 2006). The reasons for 
this, however, are more difficult to distinguish.  
 
14 This is consistent with Madden (2004) who finds the controls for selection into disability are 
insignificant in participation equations. The positive sign on  indicates that unobservables that are 
positively correlated with disability are positively correlated with employment amongst the disabled, 
which appears counterintuitive. The correlation in a standard bivariate probit model with disability and 
employment (without selection) is, however, negative and strongly significant. 
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Consistent with evidence based on longitudinal data in the UK (Jenkins and Rigg, 
2004), shorter durations of the disability are associated with higher employment 
probabilities. The effect, which is measured relative to the base group of more than 10 
years, is significant amongst males who have had their disability for less than one year 
and this extends to two years for females. This is consistent with individuals 
remaining in work until they are more aware of the permanency of their condition 
and, possibly, using sick leave in the period immediately after disability onset to 
remain employed. The cause of the disability also has a significant effect on the 
probability of employment. Of particular interest is the positive influence of onset at 
birth, particularly for men. After controlling for type, severity and duration, males 
who are born with their disability are 5% more likely to be employed than those with 
a non-work related disease or illness.15 Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that onset 
prior to labour market entry increases employment disadvantage, consistent with the 
arguments of adaptation by Wilkins (2004) and Loprest and Maag (2007).16 For men, 
having a disability which results from a traffic accident is also associated with 
significantly higher employment rates. Interestingly, for females, employment is 
positively associated with work related causes of disability either from an accident or 
progressive illness. These controls may, however, capture some prior commitment to 
work. 
 
4.3 Earnings  
Table 4 presents the results for the earnings equations for males and females 
respectively.17 In each case the estimates are presented for the earnings equation (3), 
then with controls for selection into employment and, finally, with controls for 
selection into both employment and disability. Surprisingly, both selection correction 
terms are insignificant in the earnings equation; this is, however, consistent with 
evidence from Madden (2004). 
15 It may be that the nature of birth onset disability differs from age onset disability; however, a range 
of controls for the type, severity and duration of the disability are already included in the model to 
capture these influences. 
16 Onset at birth also has a limited effect on observable characteristics such as education. Indeed, there 
is no descriptive evidence to suggest those who are disabled at birth are significantly less likely to hold 
educational qualifications. It should, however, be noted that hereditary conditions which are included in 
this group may not affect an individual prior to labour market entry. 
17A more restricted specification was also estimated, which excluded the controls for type of 
employment, since the within group differences may affect earnings through occupational choice. The 
results are fairly robust to the inclusion of the additional controls and so they are not presented here, 
but are available from the author on request. 
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Overall, within group heterogeneity appears to be a less important determinant of 
earnings than of employment, consistent with disability having a larger effect on 
employment than earnings (Blackaby et al. 1999 and Kidd et al. 2000). After 
controlling for the type of work, the measures of severity are not an important 
influence on male earnings, while for women restrictions on the amount of work and 
mobility are negatively associated with earnings. In a similar manner to employment, 
mental health problems have the most negative influence on earnings, particularly for 
women.  
 
The duration of the disability has no consistent influence on earnings for men, whilst 
for women the results appear counterintuitive, with shorter durations of disability 
being associated with lower earnings.18 These results may, however, be in part a result 
of an additional selection effect; that is, it may be those with the worst economic 
prospects that exit the labour market as the duration of the disability lengthens. As 
such, some individuals who remain employed at long durations of disability may be a 
self-selected group of higher earners.  
 
For men, at least, the cause of the disability appears to be an important determinant of 
earnings. Consistent with the positive influence of disability at birth on employment, 
this group also earn significantly more than other disabled workers. Even after 
controlling for industry and occupation, men with disability onset relating to a work 
related accident have significantly lower earnings. This may, in part, reflect a 
concentration of accidents among particularly low paid workers. 
 
The measures that control for being in sheltered employment or having assistance to 
help with work have no significant effect on earnings. Therefore, there is no evidence 
(after controlling for the type of employment) to suggest disabled workers pay for 
taking opportunities created to help their entry into employment. 
 
18The negative influence of short durations would be consistent with the effect of adaptation through 
time outweighing the negative influence of time out of the labour market or reductions in human capital 
investment. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
There is a well-established and internationally consistent literature that documents the 
labour market disadvantage faced by disabled individuals relative to their non-
disabled counterparts. The evidence presented here for the UK confirms that within 
group differences, on the basis of the type, severity and duration of the disability, are 
important determinants of employment for both men and women, despite the range of 
controls for personal and household characteristics, including receipt of disability 
benefits. The significance of these variables suggests that analysis which fails to 
control for characteristics of the disability potentially suffers from omitted variable 
bias and, therefore, inferences may be misleading. This paper also presents evidence 
which establishes the influence of the cause of disability onset on labour market 
outcomes in the UK. For males, onset of disability at birth is positively associated 
with employment and earnings in later life, and there is no evidence to suggest this 
group are more disadvantaged in the labour market than the rest of the disabled. 
 
Given the importance of the heterogeneity of the disability, it may be expected that 
general policies, which aim to increase employment amongst the disabled, will be 
more effective for certain sub-groups that are ‘nearer to the labour market’. Indeed, 
interventions may be better targeted if they relate to the specific needs of sub-groups 
of the disabled and, thus, acknowledge the existing differences in labour market 
performance within the group. Future research should also consider the influence of 
within group heterogeneity on other outcomes, such as hours and the nature of 
employment, and in the evaluation of changes in legislation, such as the introduction 
of the DDA. 
 
Whilst the information collected as part of this ad hoc module on disability provides 
additional insights into the processes involved, the data are not without their 
limitations and the features of heterogeneity are certainly not exhaustive. Indeed, this 
paper has highlighted the difficulties involved in using the currently available cross 
sectional or longitudinal evidence, given the multiple forms heterogeneity may take. If 
a disability survey is commissioned in the UK (see, Purdon 2005, for a feasibility 
study) it is essential that it contains retrospective questions relating to disability onset, 
a longitudinal element which traces changes in both the disability and labour market 
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performance, and sufficient observations for the examination of within group 
differences. It is this type of evidence that will aid policymakers who seek to 
encourage the disabled into employment, in a country with one of the highest rates of 
working age disability.  
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Table 1 Variable Means 
 Male Female 
Employment Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed, 0 if unemployed or inactive. 
0.609 0.554 
Log (hourpay) Log of hourly pay (gross weekly pay divided by usual hours). 
2.194 1.932 
Equation (1) Employment  
iX
Duration <1 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem has lasted less than a year. 
0.057 0.061 
Duration <2 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem has lasted between one and two years. 
0.066 0.072 
Duration <3 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem has lasted between two and three years. 
0.078 0.082 
Duration <5 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem has lasted between 3 and five years. 
0.127 0.129 
Duration <10 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem has lasted between 5 and 10 years.  
0.203 0.207 
Duration >10 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem has lasted more than 10 years (base). 
0.470 0.449 
Birth Dummy variable equals 1 if the cause of health problem is born with it or birth related (including hereditary).  
0.190 0.193 
Work acc Dummy variable equals 1 if the cause of health problem is work-related accident or injury. 
0.092 0.038 
Traffic acc Dummy variable equals 1 if the cause of health problem is traffic accident or injury. 
0.035 0.033 
Household acc Dummy variable equals 1 if the cause of health problem is household, leisure or sports accident or injury. 
0.044 0.037 
Work illness Dummy variable equals 1 if the cause of health problem is work-related disease or illness. 
0.148 0.068 
Other illness Dummy variable equals 1 if the cause of health problem is non-work related disease or illness (base) 
0.491 0.631 
Kind Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem affects the kind of work. 
0.571 0.544 
Amount Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem affects the amount of work. 
0.458 0.461 
Mobility1 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem greatly affects getting to work. 
0.191 0.174 
Mobility2 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem affects getting to work to some extent. 
0.127 0.151 
Mobility3 Dummy variable equals 1 if health problem does not affect getting to work. (base) 
0.682 0.675 
Number health Number of separately recorded different types of health problem. 
2.078 2.117 
Limbs 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the main health problem 
affects limbs (includes arms, hands, legs, feet, back and 
neck). 
0.341 0.327 
Sight/hearing Dummy variable equals 1 if the main health problem affects sight, hearing or speech. 
0.050 0.032 
Chest/heart Dummy variable equals 1 if the main health problem affects skin, chest breathing, blood, heart or stomach. 
0.432 0.380 
Mental health Dummy variable equals 1 if the main health problem is 0.078 0.092 
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mental illness (includes depression, bad nerves, learning 
difficulties, phobia, panics). 
Other health Dummy variable equals 1 if the main health problem is other (includes progressive illness and epilepsy). (base) 
0.098 0.169 
iY
Aged 16-24 Dummy variable equals 1 if aged between 16 and 24.   0.060 0.070 
Aged 25-34 Dummy variable equals 1 if aged between 25 and 34.   0.130 0.167 
Aged 35-44 Dummy variable equals 1 if aged between 35 and 44.   0.207 0.249 
Aged 45-54 Dummy variable equals 1 if aged between 45 and 54.   0.263 0.315 
Aged 55-
retirement 
Dummy variable equals 1 if aged between 55 and 
retirement.   
0.340 0.200 
White Dummy variable equals 1 if ethnic group is white.   0.948 0.937 
Single Dummy variable equals 1 if marital status is single. 0.245 0.223 
Married Dummy variable equals 1 if marital status is married. 0.618 0.563 
Other Dummy variables equals 1 if marital status is separated, widowed or divorced. (base) 
0.131 0.196 
Degree Dummy variable equals 1 if highest qualification is university degree or higher degree. 
0.112 0.098 
Other higher 
education 
Dummy variable equals 1 if highest qualification is 
other higher education. 
0.066 0.092 
A level Dummy variable equals 1 if highest qualification is A level or equivalent.(a) 
0.306 0.139 
O level Dummy variable quals 1 if highest qualification is O level or equivalent. (b) 
0.142 0.244 
Other Dummy variable equals 1 if highest qualification is other qualification. 
0.146 0.155 
None Dummy variable equals 1 if highest qualification is no qualifications. (base) 
0.228 0.272 
Other earner Dummy variable equals 1 if someone else in the household works. 
0.530 0.606 
Child 19 Number of dependent children aged less than 19 in household if individual is head of household or spouse. 
0.538 0.692 
Child 2 Number of dependent children aged less than 2 in household if individual is head of household or spouse. 
0.037 0.045 
Social housing Dummy variable equals 1 if house is rented from non-private sector. 
0.223 0.261 
Private renting Dummy variable equals 1 if house is rented from the private sector or other. (base) 
0.076 0.081 
Owned Dummy variable equals 1 if house is owned outright. 0.242 0.190 
Mortgaged Dummy variable equals 1 if house is mortgaged. 0.460 0.468 
Unemploy12 Dummy variable equals 1 if unemployed 12 months ago. 
0.042 0.023 
Sickness 
Benefit 
Dummy variable equals 1 if individual claims incapacity 
benefit or any other sickness related benefit. (c) 
0.276 0.226 
Equation (3) Earnings only  
Sheltered Dummy variable equals 1 if working in sheltered employment. 
0.026 0.034 
Assistance Dummy variable equals 1 if individual needs and receives assistance to help work. (d) 
0.025 0.032 
Experience Age minus school leaving age in years. 26.695 24.527  
Tenure Length of time in current job in months. 120.526 84.816 
Part Dummy variable equals 1 if employed part-time. 0.067 0.420 
Small firm Dummy variable equals 1 if employed in a workplace 0.298 0.366 
Page 23 of 41
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
24
with fewer than 25 employees. 
Temporary Dummy variable equals 1 if in temporary employment. 0.038 0.058 
Equation (2) Disability only  
Other disabled Dummy variable equals 1 if another member of the household has a long-term health problem. 
0.244 0.247 
Notes: Means relate to estimation samples. Controls for region of current residence, industry and 
occupation are included but are not reported.  
(a) A (advanced) level is an optional standardised qualification taken in two years after compulsory 
schooling in the UK. 
(b) O (ordinary) level (replaced by GCSE) is a standardised qualification usually taken in the final year 
of compulsory schooling in the UK. 
(c)  This includes Severe Disablement Allowance, Mobility Allowance, Statutory Sick Pay, Invalid Care 
Allowance, Disability Working Allowance/Disabled Persons Tax Credit, Disability Living Allowance, 
Attendance Allowance, Industrial Injury Disablement Benefit. 
(d) Examples include special adaptations or equipment, support in getting to and from work, 
understanding by superiors or colleagues, assistance in the kind of work, assistance in the amount of 
work and assistance in getting around at work. This question is only asked to those who state they have 
problems with the kind, amount or getting to work. It is assumed that the disabled who are not asked 
this question do not need any form of assistance and are therefore included in the zero category. Those 
who need, but do not get assistance are not separated from those who do not need assistance since the 
latter variable is a function of severity and therefore would be highly correlated with variables relating 
to difficulties with the kind and amount of work.  
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Table 2. The influence of within group heterogeneity on the employment of the disabled males 
 
Probit Bivariate Probit 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Employ Disability Employ Disability 
Constant 0.019 0.089 -0.123 0.113* -0.107 0.111* 
(0.11) (0.50) (0.64) (1.75) (0.52) (1.72) 
Age 16-24 0.235** 0.208** 0.080 -1.017*** -0.004 -1.018*** 
(2.45) (2.10) (0.58) (26.17) (0.03) (26.16) 
Age 25-34 0.665*** 0.654*** 0.535*** -0.812*** 0.469*** -0.812*** 
(8.80) (8.36) (4.46) (27.30) (3.45) (27.31) 
Age 35-44 0.623*** 0.616*** 0.520*** -0.612*** 0.471*** -0.612*** 
(9.82) (9.31) (5.39) (23.26) (4.30) (23.25) 
Age 45-54 0.575*** 0.598*** 0.517*** -0.342*** 0.514*** -0.343*** 
(11.33) (11.21) (7.80) (14.70) (6.80) (14.72) 
Duration <1 0.315*** 0.258*** 0.308***  0.249***  
(3.85) (3.07) (3.81)  (3.02)  
Duration <2 0.132* 0.093 0.130*  0.090  
(1.74) (1.18) (1.73)  (1.17)  
Duration <3 0.100 0.036 0.098  0.035  
(1.41) (0.50) (1.40)  (0.50)  
Duration <5 -0.008 -0.066 -0.009  -0.065  
(0.15) (1.12) (0.16)  (1.13)  
Duration <10 -0.055 -0.086* -0.053  -0.082*  
(1.12) (1.68) (1.11)  (1.65)  
Birth 0.158*** 0.170*** 0.158***  0.167***  
(2.95) (3.06) (3.00)  (3.09)  
Work acc 0.028 0.116 0.026  0.111  
(0.41) (1.60) (0.39)  (1.57)  
Traffic acc 0.229** 0.225** 0.220**  0.213**  
(2.24) (2.09) (2.17)  (2.03)  
Household  0.102 0.129 0.098  0.121  
(1.06) (1.27) (1.03)  (1.23)  
Work illness 0.035 0.040 0.033  0.038  
(0.64) (0.71) (0.62)  (0.68)  
Kind -0.357*** -0.306*** -0.352***  -0.297***  
(6.78) (5.63) (6.71)  (5.50)  
Amount -0.591*** -0.402*** -0.581***  -0.390***  
(11.31) (7.30) (10.96)  (7.06)  
Mobility1 -1.434*** -1.033*** -1.415***  -1.005***  
(23.30) (15.36) (21.05)  (13.78)  
Mobility2 -0.598*** -0.439*** -0.588***  -0.424***  
(11.66) (7.99) (11.27)  (7.62)  
Number health -0.127*** -0.074*** -0.124***  -0.070***  
(8.92) (4.89) (8.67)  (4.69)  
Limbs 0.052 -0.007 0.053  -0.006  
(0.76) (0.10) (0.79)  (0.08)  
Sight/hearing 0.060 0.051 0.047  0.033  
(0.60) (0.49) (0.47)  (0.32)  
Chest/heart 0.019 -0.056 0.017  -0.058  
(0.29) (0.80) (0.27)  (0.86)  
Mental  -0.568*** -0.398*** -0.558***  -0.385***  
(6.53) (4.34) (6.43)  (4.26)  
White 0.298*** 0.403*** 0.299*** 0.066* 0.399*** 0.067** 
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(3.69) (4.92) (3.75) (1.94) (4.94) (1.98) 
Single -0.131* -0.133* -0.127* 0.012 -0.126* 0.012 
(1.89) (1.84) (1.84) (0.41) (1.77) (0.40) 
Married -0.033 -0.018 -0.024 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
(0.56) (0.29) (0.41) (0.19) (0.06) (0.18) 
Degree 0.250*** 0.175** 0.182** -0.432*** 0.079 -0.431*** 
(3.52) (2.39) (2.09) (15.26) (0.85) (15.24) 
Other higher  0.191** 0.134 0.141 -0.296*** 0.066 -0.295*** 
(2.36) (1.60) (1.63) (8.68) (0.74) (8.66) 
A level 0.282*** 0.264*** 0.245*** -0.213*** 0.210*** -0.213*** 
(5.45) (4.87) (4.25) (8.91) (3.41) (8.90) 
O level 0.187*** 0.149** 0.154** -0.205*** 0.105 -0.206*** 
(2.98) (2.27) (2.33) (7.47) (1.51) (7.50) 
Other educ 0.300*** 0.301*** 0.272*** -0.175*** 0.259*** -0.174*** 
(5.01) (4.84) (4.29) (6.30) (3.86) (6.27) 
Other earner 0.449*** 0.425*** 0.413*** -0.234*** 0.372*** -0.234*** 
(11.31) (10.29) (8.44) (13.46) (6.84) (13.43) 
Child 19 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.026*** -0.012 -0.026*** 
(0.05) (0.27) (0.13) (2.79) (0.51) (2.82) 
Child 2 0.111 0.034 0.087 -0.093*** 0.005 -0.092*** 
(1.04) (0.31) (0.82) (2.67) (0.04) (2.64) 
Social  -0.264*** -0.248*** -0.207** 0.316*** -0.171* 0.316*** 
(3.58) (3.26) (2.51) (9.58) (1.96) (9.59) 
Owned 0.078 0.053 0.067 -0.090*** 0.037 -0.090*** 
(1.05) (0.69) (0.91) (2.77) (0.50) (2.76) 
Mortgaged 0.508*** 0.494*** 0.480*** -0.127*** 0.450*** -0.128*** 
(7.15) (6.76) (6.52) (4.38) (5.81) (4.41) 
Unemploy12 -0.849*** -0.955*** -0.835***  -0.925***  
(10.85) (12.18) (10.52)  (11.19)  
Sickness benefit  -1.178***   -1.148***  
(22.28)   (18.30)  
Other disabled    0.348***  0.346*** 
(19.99)  (19.80) 

(p-value) 
 0.215 
(0.15) 
0.298* 
(0.09) 
Observations 9215 9205 35130 35120 
Uncensored   9196 9186 
Pseudo R2
Likelihood ratio  
(p-value) 
0.50 
6170.38 
(0.00) 
0.54 
6678.98 
(0.00) 
 
Wald test  
(p-value) 
 1788.42 
(0.00) 
1602.89 
(0.00) 
Notes to table: Specification includes a full set of regional dummies not reported here. Absolute T statistics 
reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Significance 
of  tested using a likelihood ratio test for independent equations. 
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Table 3. The influence of within group heterogeneity on the employment of the disabled females 
 
Probit Bivariate Probit 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Employ Disability Employ Disability 
Constant -0.103 -0.071 -0.237 0.066 -0.194 0.064 
(0.65) (0.44) (1.36) (1.03) (1.09) (0.99) 
Age 16-24 0.175* 0.135 0.064 -0.832*** 0.035 -0.831*** 
(1.83) (1.39) (0.56) (20.36) (0.30) (20.34) 
Age 25-34 0.322*** 0.333*** 0.224** -0.634*** 0.243*** -0.634*** 
(4.48) (4.54) (2.45) (19.42) (2.61) (19.40) 
Age 35-44 0.454*** 0.489*** 0.379*** -0.456*** 0.420*** -0.457*** 
(7.26) (7.63) (5.02) (15.20) (5.44) (15.22) 
Age 45-54 0.306*** 0.332*** 0.273*** -0.233*** 0.303*** -0.233*** 
(6.08) (6.46) (5.06) (8.90) (5.47) (8.89) 
Duration <1 0.335*** 0.246*** 0.335***  0.248***  
(4.46) (3.27) (4.50)  (3.32)  
Duration <2 0.155** 0.123* 0.153**  0.122*  
(2.27) (1.78) (2.27)  (1.78)  
Duration <3 0.083 0.060 0.080  0.058  
(1.28) (0.91) (1.25)  (0.89)  
Duration <5 0.008 -0.016 0.005  -0.018  
(0.14) (0.30) (0.10)  (0.34)  
Duration <10 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.000  
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01)  
Birth 0.066 0.077 0.069  0.079*  
(1.41) (1.62) (1.50)  (1.69)  
Work acc 0.266*** 0.357*** 0.267***  0.356***  
(2.86) (3.69) (2.91)  (3.72)  
Traffic acc 0.101 0.115 0.099  0.113  
(1.01) (1.12) (1.00)  (1.11)  
Household  0.067 0.052 0.068  0.052  
(0.70) (0.53) (0.72)  (0.54)  
Work illness 0.166** 0.184*** 0.165**  0.183***  
(2.39) (2.58) (2.40)  (2.59)  
Kind -0.362*** -0.332*** -0.357***  -0.329***  
(7.42) (6.70) (7.33)  (6.64)  
Amount -0.502*** -0.387*** -0.494***  -0.383***  
(10.09) (7.59) (9.95)  (7.54)  
Mobility1 -1.268*** -0.949*** -1.250***  -0.938***  
(20.07) (14.04) (19.25)  (13.81)  
Mobility2 -0.566*** -0.467*** -0.562***  -0.465***  
(11.68) (9.34) (11.59)  (9.34)  
Number health -0.087*** -0.061*** -0.085***  -0.059***  
(6.61) (4.47) (6.55)  (4.43)  
Limbs 0.036 0.003 0.036  0.005  
(0.66) (0.05) (0.66)  (0.08)  
Sight/hearing -0.149 -0.138 -0.147  -0.135  
(1.47) (1.33) (1.46)  (1.31)  
Breathing/heart -0.012 -0.062 -0.012  -0.061  
(0.23) (1.20) (0.23)  (1.18)  
Mental health -0.553*** -0.497*** -0.546***  -0.491***  
(7.30) (6.43) (7.22)  (6.36)  
White 0.314*** 0.349*** 0.307*** 0.004 0.341*** 0.004 
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(4.33) (4.77) (4.26) (0.12) (4.69) (0.11) 
Single -0.099 -0.065 -0.106* -0.088*** -0.073 -0.089*** 
(1.62) (1.04) (1.74) (3.20) (1.17) (3.25) 
Married -0.339*** -0.347*** -0.330*** -0.091*** -0.340*** -0.092*** 
(6.77) (6.81) (6.62) (3.87) (6.68) (3.88) 
Degree 0.881*** 0.854*** 0.819*** -0.332*** 0.798*** -0.331*** 
(12.11) (11.53) (9.76) (11.34) (9.42) (11.31) 
Other higher  0.619*** 0.600*** 0.580*** -0.206*** 0.566*** -0.205*** 
(9.27) (8.80) (8.15) (6.73) (7.82) (6.70) 
A level 0.477*** 0.462*** 0.444*** -0.181*** 0.432*** -0.180*** 
(8.14) (7.73) (7.19) (6.65) (6.90) (6.61) 
O level 0.432*** 0.437*** 0.400*** -0.184*** 0.408*** -0.183*** 
(8.65) (8.56) (7.43) (7.78) (7.43) (7.73) 
Other educ 0.341*** 0.335*** 0.316*** -0.176*** 0.314*** -0.175*** 
(6.29) (6.08) (5.60) (6.66) (5.46) (6.62) 
Other earner 0.456*** 0.440*** 0.419*** -0.220*** 0.407*** -0.220*** 
(10.68) (10.15) (8.85) (11.10) (8.50) (11.08) 
Child 19 -0.246*** -0.260*** -0.253*** -0.072*** -0.266*** -0.071*** 
(11.62) (12.06) (11.99) (8.12) (12.36) (8.10) 
Child 2 -0.540*** -0.525*** -0.554*** -0.088*** -0.538*** -0.088*** 
(6.79) (6.59) (7.05) (2.74) (6.82) (2.74) 
Social housing -0.199*** -0.198*** -0.156** 0.275*** -0.159** 0.274*** 
(2.85) (2.79) (2.12) (8.60) (2.12) (8.59) 
Owned -0.015 -0.014 -0.042 -0.192*** -0.039 -0.192*** 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.56) (5.72) (0.52) (5.73) 
Mortgaged 0.373*** 0.402*** 0.348*** -0.132*** 0.379*** -0.133*** 
(5.55) (5.91) (5.09) (4.56) (5.46) (4.58) 
Unemploy12 -0.252** -0.350*** -0.251**  -0.348***  
(2.44) (3.40) (2.47)  (3.42)  
Sickness benefit  -0.889***   -0.876***  
(16.04)   (15.55)  
Other disabled    0.405***  0.406*** 
(23.20)  (23.21) 

(p-value) 
 0.197* 
(0.08) 
0.180 
(0.11) 
Observations 
Uncensored 
8552 8548 34550 
8538 
34546 
8534 
Pseudo R2
Likelihood ratio  
(p-value) 
0.40 
4696.95 
(0.00) 
0.42 
4968.80 
(0.00) 
 
Wald test  
(p-value) 
 1856.07 
(0.00) 
1961.92 
(0.00) 
Notes to table: See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4. The influence of within group heterogeneity on the earnings of disabled workers. 
 
Males Females 
OLS Employment 
selection 
Double 
selection 
OLS Employment 
selection 
Double 
selection 
Constant 1.777*** 1.741*** 1.844*** 1.908*** 1.933*** 1.888*** 
(12.73) (11.80) (9.41) (14.96) (13.97) (10.91) 
Sheltered -0.068 -0.074 -0.075 -0.086 -0.083 -0.082 
(1.01) (1.10) (1.09) (1.56) (1.51) (1.47) 
Assistance -0.073 -0.098 -0.099 0.077 0.058 0.059 
(1.05) (1.41) (1.39) (1.29) (0.97) (0.96) 
Experience  0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
(6.25) (6.24) (5.72) (4.82) (5.18) (5.06) 
-0.045*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.034*** Experience 
Sq/100 (6.36) (6.21) (6.08) (4.22) (4.62) (4.32) 
Tenure 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(4.48) (4.69) (4.57) (3.14) (3.25) (3.18) 
Tenure Sq/100 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(2.22) (2.36) (2.29) (0.84) (0.99) (0.99) 
Birth 0.058** 0.054* 0.054* 0.018 0.017 0.018 
(2.08) (1.93) (1.88) (0.73) (0.69) (0.69) 
Work acc -0.089** -0.081* -0.081* 0.030 0.032 0.031 
(2.06) (1.90) (1.85) (0.56) (0.59) (0.55) 
Traffic acc -0.095 -0.098* -0.101* 0.060 0.070 0.072 
(1.63) (1.70) (1.72) (1.11) (1.30) (1.29) 
Household acc -0.054 -0.063 -0.064 0.010 0.011 0.011 
(1.17) (1.35) (1.35) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Work illness -0.028 -0.022 -0.024 0.003 0.006 0.005 
(0.86) (0.68) (0.70) (0.08) (0.15) (0.13) 
Duration <1 0.022 0.020 0.019 -0.074* -0.092** -0.093** 
(0.50) (0.46) (0.44) (1.85) (2.27) (2.25) 
Duration <2 0.076* 0.074* 0.073* -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 
(1.90) (1.87) (1.80) (0.03) (0.20) (0.22) 
Duration <3 0.050 0.045 0.044 -0.068* -0.080** -0.082** 
(1.31) (1.16) (1.13) (1.80) (2.13) (2.14) 
Duration <5 0.061* 0.052 0.052 -0.005 -0.013 -0.014 
(1.76) (1.51) (1.48) (0.16) (0.42) (0.43) 
Duration <10 0.010 0.006 0.008 -0.010 -0.016 -0.017 
(0.33) (0.21) (0.27) (0.39) (0.60) (0.60) 
Kind -0.035 -0.041 -0.041 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
(1.32) (1.52) (1.46) (0.22) (0.06) (0.03) 
Amount -0.014 -0.028 -0.023 -0.056* -0.064* -0.061* 
(0.43) (0.74) (0.58) (1.89) (1.78) (1.67) 
Mobility1 -0.089 -0.071 -0.055 -0.106* -0.144* -0.138* 
(1.14) (0.72) (0.53) (1.66) (1.83) (1.71) 
Mobility2 0.040 0.033 0.039 -0.126*** -0.146*** -0.144*** 
(1.00) (0.73) (0.84) (3.58) (3.71) (3.57) 
Number health -0.018* -0.018* -0.018 0.006 0.007 0.007 
(1.72) (1.68) (1.62) (0.62) (0.73) (0.75) 
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Limbs    0.031 0.042 0.042 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 
(0.76) (1.04) (1.03) (0.58) (0.59) (0.54) 
Sight/hearing -0.010 -0.001 -0.002 -0.107* -0.108* -0.108* 
(0.18) (0.01) (0.04) (1.81) (1.87) (1.81) 
Chest/heart -0.010 0.000 0.001 -0.032 -0.035 -0.033 
(0.28) (0.01) (0.03) (1.12) (1.24) (1.16) 
Mental health -0.107* -0.092 -0.088 -0.132** -0.153*** -0.149** 
(1.67) (1.40) (1.32) (2.40) (2.61) (2.48) 
White 0.082 0.101* 0.098* -0.029 -0.002 -0.005 
(1.48) (1.77) (1.68) (0.62) (0.05) (0.10) 
Single -0.025 -0.015 -0.019 -0.005 -0.010 -0.009 
(0.58) (0.34) (0.42) (0.13) (0.29) (0.25) 
Married 0.036 0.040 0.039 -0.049* -0.049* -0.051* 
(1.03) (1.14) (1.09) (1.79) (1.75) (1.75) 
Degree 0.352*** 0.354*** 0.364*** 0.318*** 0.322*** 0.313*** 
(7.30) (7.17) (6.95) (6.75) (6.22) (5.78) 
Other high ed     0.156*** 0.147*** 0.156*** 0.245*** 0.255*** 0.249*** 
(3.06) (2.82) (2.85) (5.36) (5.28) (5.00) 
A level 0.073* 0.066* 0.074* 0.098** 0.093** 0.086* 
(1.88) (1.66) (1.76) (2.38) (2.13) (1.90) 
O level 0.110*** 0.105** 0.113** 0.058 0.058 0.054 
(2.58) (2.45) (2.50) (1.64) (1.51) (1.35) 
Other educ 0.011 0.002 0.006 -0.010 -0.008 -0.013 
(0.27) (0.04) (0.14) (0.26) (0.20) (0.32) 
Part-time -0.043 -0.030 -0.029 -0.040* -0.055** -0.056** 
(0.96) (0.68) (0.63) (1.75) (2.37) (2.34) 
Small firm -0.115*** -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.096*** -0.099*** -0.098*** 
(4.82) (5.03) (4.95) (4.49) (4.62) (4.46) 
Temporary 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.054 0.039 0.039 
(0.02) (0.12) (0.11) (1.26) (0.91) (0.89) 
Social housing -0.128** -0.160*** -0.174*** -0.079* -0.080* -0.072 
(2.50) (2.98) (3.00) (1.78) (1.76) (1.47) 
Owned -0.025 -0.054 -0.050 -0.064 -0.061 -0.067 
(0.52) (1.10) (0.99) (1.42) (1.36) (1.43) 
Mortgage 0.001 -0.012 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 -0.007 
(0.03) (0.28) (0.22) (0.21) (0.04) (0.16) 
0.042 0.014  0.035 0.032 Lambda 
(employment)  (0.68)   (0.21)  (0.61) (0.55) 
-0.054   0.032 Lambda 
(disability)   (0.79)   (0.52) 
Observations 1537 3043 13112 1521 3058 13219 
Uncensored  1494 1494  1472 1470 
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
F test 
(p-value) 
25.87 
(0.00) 
24.81 
(0.00) 
24.44 
(0.00) 
25.30 
(0.00) 
24.39 
(0.00) 
23.97 
(0.00) 
Notes to table: See notes to Table 2. Specification also included controls for industry and occupation of 
employment, but these are not reported here. 
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*************NOT FOR INCLUSION IN MAIN TEXT************
Additional Sensitivity Analysis for Referee 1 only. 
Since the selection effects are not significant all results relate to the basic probit or OLS 
specifications.
1. Exclude duration and cause of disability.
Employment Probit
Males Females
Age 16-24 0.252*** 0.168*
(2.69) (1.80)
Age 25-34 0.684*** 0.304***
(9.28) (4.32)
Age 35-44 0.646*** 0.443***
(10.41) (7.28)
Age 45-54 0.570*** 0.312***
(11.52) (6.36)
Kind -0.359*** -0.360***
(6.96) (7.54)
Amount -0.598*** -0.496***
(11.69) (10.23)
Mobility1 -1.429*** -1.259***
(23.98) (20.67)
Mobility2 -0.607*** -0.550***
(12.08) (11.71)
Number of health -0.126*** -0.095***
(9.12) (7.42)
Limbs 0.056 0.074
(0.87) (1.45)
Sight/hearing 0.071 -0.143
(0.73) (1.44)
Chest/heart 0.019 -0.025
(0.29) (0.50)
Mental health -0.593*** -0.545***
(7.01) (7.44)
White 0.306*** 0.316***
(3.88) (4.50)
Single -0.097 -0.098
(1.43) (1.63)
Married -0.029 -0.339***
(0.50) (6.97)
Degree 0.272*** 0.881***
(3.92) (12.41)
Other higher 0.176** 0.643***
(2.23) (9.87)
A level 0.286*** 0.499***
(5.66) (8.70)
O level 0.171*** 0.447***
(2.79) (9.17)
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Other educ 0.308*** 0.342***
(5.27) (6.50)
Other earner 0.452*** 0.449***
(11.65) (10.80)
Child 19 0.003 -0.240***
(0.14) (11.65)
Child 2 0.126 -0.535***
(1.20) (6.83)
Social -0.261*** -0.202***
(3.59) (2.97)
Owned 0.077 0.007
(1.06) (0.10)
Mortgaged 0.510*** 0.382***
(7.30) (5.83)
Unemploy12 -0.864*** -0.246**
(11.17) (2.47)
Constant 0.059 -0.056
(0.36) (0.37)
Observations 9598 8893
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OLS Earnings Equation
Male Female
Sheltered -0.055 -0.113**
(0.85) (2.13)
Assistance -0.073 0.067
(1.05) (1.17)
Experience 0.023*** 0.017***
(5.84) (4.69)
Experience Sq -0.000*** -0.000***
(5.96) (4.12)
Tenure 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.93) (3.25)
Tenure Sq -0.000** -0.000
(2.57) (0.94)
Kind -0.042 0.009
(1.63) (0.36)
Amount -0.024 -0.064**
(0.76) (2.23)
Mobility1 -0.032 -0.125**
(0.42) (1.99)
Mobility2 0.043 -0.117***
(1.08) (3.43)
Number of health -0.018* 0.008
(1.72) (0.88)
Limbs 0.013 -0.003
(0.35) (0.09)
Sight/hearing -0.006 -0.097*
(0.11) (1.69)
Chest/heart 0.013 -0.024
(0.35) (0.90)
Mental health -0.091 -0.115**
(1.48) (2.19)
White 0.067 -0.029
(1.23) (0.64)
Single -0.026 0.005
(0.62) (0.15)
Married 0.035 -0.040
(1.03) (1.51)
Degree 0.347*** 0.326***
(7.34) (7.06)
Other high educ     0.140*** 0.242***
(2.80) (5.46)
A level 0.077** 0.094**
(2.03) (2.34)
O level 0.098** 0.058*
(2.35) (1.67)
Other educ 0.004 -0.011
(0.09) (0.30)
Professional occupations -0.020 0.127***
(0.50) (2.60)
Associate professional and -0.169*** -0.119***
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technical
(4.46) (2.78)
Administrative and secretarial -0.416*** -0.297***
(8.75) (7.44)
Skilled trades occupations -0.413*** -0.534***
(10.75) (6.89)
Personal service occupations -0.542*** -0.494***
(7.75) (10.92)
Sales and customer service 
occupation
-0.420*** -0.418***
(6.85) (8.78)
Process, plant and machine 
operatives
-0.530*** -0.484***
(13.49) (7.17)
Elementary occupations -0.597*** -0.531***
(14.68) (11.34)
Agriculture & fishing dummy 0.022 0.263**
(0.21) (2.19)
Energy & water dummy 0.349*** 0.592***
(3.90) (3.72)
Manufacturing dummy 0.228*** 0.076
(4.18) (1.34)
Construction dummy 0.252*** 0.163*
(4.02) (1.76)
Distribution, hotels & restaurants 
dummy
0.101* -0.072
(1.80) (1.45)
Transport & communication 
dummy
0.238*** 0.096
(3.98) (1.52)
Banking, finance & insurance 
dummy
0.284*** 0.124**
(5.05) (2.50)
Public admin, education & health 
dummy
0.134** 0.039
(2.43) (0.86)
Part-time -0.032 -0.040*
(0.74) (1.82)
Small firm -0.111*** -0.098***
(4.75) (4.72)
Temporary 0.018 0.046
(0.32) (1.09)
Social -0.146*** -0.089**
(2.95) (2.05)
Owned -0.032 -0.066
(0.68) (1.50)
Mortgaged -0.000 -0.005
(0.01) (0.13)
Constant 1.818*** 1.906***
(13.41) (15.43)
Observations 1592 1577
R-squared 0.53 0.53
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2. Definition of disability
Employment Probit
Work-limited disabled DDA disabled
Male Female Male Female
Age 16-24 0.256** 0.324** 0.373*** 0.363***
(2.04) (2.49) (2.73) (2.60)
Age 25-34 0.682*** 0.387*** 0.670*** 0.341***
(7.27) (3.96) (6.72) (3.58)
Age 35-44 0.593*** 0.423*** 0.628*** 0.438***
(7.56) (5.18) (7.74) (5.57)
Age 45-54 0.477*** 0.266*** 0.580*** 0.247***
(7.61) (4.03) (9.04) (3.90)
Duration <1 0.541*** 0.518*** 0.510*** 0.558***
(5.05) (5.09) (4.71) (5.29)
Duration <2 0.174* 0.216** 0.219** 0.180**
(1.78) (2.33) (2.20) (1.99)
Duration <3 0.183** 0.055 0.138 0.056
(2.04) (0.63) (1.47) (0.66)
Duration <5 -0.004 -0.014 0.017 0.002
(0.05) (0.20) (0.24) (0.02)
Duration <10 -0.044 0.038 -0.028 -0.010
(0.73) (0.62) (0.44) (0.16)
Birth 0.243*** 0.116* 0.229*** 0.071
(3.48) (1.79) (3.25) (1.13)
Work acc 0.031 0.179* -0.028 0.221**
(0.39) (1.77) (0.32) (2.00)
Traffic acc 0.328*** 0.074 0.183 0.112
(2.83) (0.62) (1.42) (0.90)
Household 0.131 0.008 0.072 -0.028
(1.11) (0.06) (0.52) (0.22)
Work illness -0.002 0.187** 0.079 0.113
(0.03) (2.23) (1.14) (1.29)
Kind -0.889*** -0.720*** -0.476*** -0.437***
(6.09) (6.98) (6.20) (6.46)
Amount -0.638*** -0.592*** -0.571*** -0.508***
(10.94) (10.05) (8.13) (7.87)
Mobility1 -1.425*** -1.279*** -1.431*** -1.292***
(21.91) (18.91) (21.08) (18.69)
Mobility2 -0.651*** -0.673*** -0.646*** -0.596***
(11.15) (11.76) (10.56) (10.34)
Number health -0.148*** -0.089*** -0.120*** -0.085***
(9.27) (5.90) (7.40) (5.68)
Limbs 0.084 0.010 0.107 -0.027
(1.03) (0.14) (1.29) (0.39)
Sight/hearing 0.051 -0.297** 0.098 -0.325**
(0.39) (2.17) (0.67) (1.96)
Breathing/heart 0.116 -0.086 0.095 -0.083
(1.43) (1.17) (1.19) (1.28)
Mental health -0.559*** -0.600*** -0.562*** -0.686***
(5.56) (6.44) (5.45) (7.45)
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White 0.225** 0.390*** 0.370*** 0.386***
(2.27) (3.95) (3.54) (4.07)
Single -0.143* -0.115 -0.050 -0.094
(1.65) (1.46) (0.55) (1.18)
Married -0.059 -0.290*** -0.032 -0.325***
(0.80) (4.52) (0.43) (5.09)
Degree 0.423*** 0.978*** 0.288*** 0.941***
(4.51) (10.02) (2.99) (9.79)
Other higher 0.251** 0.536*** 0.242** 0.655***
(2.35) (6.04) (2.31) (7.54)
A level 0.352*** 0.437*** 0.333*** 0.453***
(5.58) (5.64) (5.04) (5.99)
O level 0.239*** 0.434*** 0.266*** 0.476***
(3.08) (6.56) (3.28) (7.44)
Other educ 0.329*** 0.322*** 0.309*** 0.364***
(4.54) (4.54) (4.07) (5.25)
Other earner 0.417*** 0.505*** 0.408*** 0.471***
(8.33) (8.98) (7.87) (8.52)
Child 19 0.010 -0.194*** 0.007 -0.200***
(0.34) (6.67) (0.23) (7.12)
Child 2 0.030 -0.539*** 0.125 -0.701***
(0.23) (4.60) (0.86) (5.94)
Social housing -0.227** -0.234** -0.249** -0.130
(2.44) (2.50) (2.46) (1.41)
Owned 0.229** -0.039 0.225** 0.038
(2.40) (0.39) (2.20) (0.39)
Mortgaged 0.623*** 0.278*** 0.557*** 0.447***
(6.85) (3.02) (5.67) (5.02)
Unemploy12 -0.797*** -0.232* -0.646*** -0.204
(8.17) (1.80) (5.82) (1.45)
Constant 0.451* 0.245 -0.356 -0.221
(1.77) (1.06) (1.60) (1.10)
Observations 5420 4881 5403 5344
Notes: All specifications are the same as in the paper, however since the work-limited have a health problem which 
effects either the kind or amount of work interpretation of these variables is quite different.
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OLS Earnings
Work-limited disabled DDA disabled
Male Female Male Female
Sheltered -0.135 -0.119 -0.108 -0.033
(1.49) (1.44) (1.26) (0.45)
Assistance -0.105 0.044 -0.057 -0.013
(1.45) (0.64) (0.70) (0.18)
Experience 0.019*** 0.011 0.027*** 0.010
(2.87) (1.54) (4.20) (1.64)
Experience Sq -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
(3.06) (1.39) (4.27) (1.35)
Tenure 0.001 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001***
(1.32) (2.16) (3.64) (2.94)
Tenure Sq 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.47) (0.59) (1.78) (1.40)
Birth 0.102** 0.020 0.094** -0.010
(2.07) (0.40) (2.09) (0.27)
Work acc -0.099* 0.055 -0.080 0.036
(1.67) (0.81) (1.23) (0.51)
Traffic acc -0.149* 0.003 -0.078 -0.035
(1.94) (0.04) (0.90) (0.43)
Household acc -0.034 -0.046 -0.165* -0.092
(0.51) (0.60) (1.71) (1.05)
Work illness -0.080 -0.033 -0.047 0.040
(1.53) (0.57) (0.88) (0.75)
Duration <1 0.043 -0.010 -0.029 -0.027
(0.64) (0.13) (0.41) (0.42)
Duration <2 0.156** -0.113* 0.108* 0.045
(2.20) (1.72) (1.72) (0.82)
Duration <3 0.083 0.012 0.047 0.022
(1.31) (0.17) (0.76) (0.38)
Duration <5 0.060 -0.029 0.075 0.016
(1.07) (0.53) (1.39) (0.34)
Duration <10 0.037 -0.035 0.030 -0.024
(0.79) (0.74) (0.65) (0.60)
Kind 0.093 -0.060 -0.035 -0.025
(1.19) (0.97) (0.86) (0.68)
Amount 0.015 -0.062* -0.029 -0.090**
(0.41) (1.66) (0.63) (2.33)
Mobility1 -0.143* -0.176** -0.107 -0.090
(1.77) (2.27) (1.19) (1.28)
Mobility2 0.054 -0.128*** 0.053 -0.099**
(1.08) (2.62) (0.99) (2.23)
Number health -0.020 0.010 -0.011 0.012
(1.46) (0.78) (0.82) (1.03)
Limbs   -0.008 0.021 -0.036 -0.001
(0.13) (0.36) (0.62) (0.02)
Sight/hearing 0.059 -0.059 -0.018 -0.057
(0.70) (0.60) (0.17) (0.46)
Chest/heart -0.013 0.018 -0.054 -0.025
(0.23) (0.32) (1.05) (0.66)
Mental health -0.054 -0.110 -0.148 -0.153**
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(0.60) (1.28) (1.45) (2.04)
White 0.030 -0.062 0.039 -0.114*
(0.32) (0.85) (0.44) (1.78)
Single -0.041 0.044 0.015 0.052
(0.58) (0.73) (0.21) (1.01)
Married 0.053 -0.101** 0.045 -0.078**
(0.95) (2.29) (0.81) (2.02)
Degree 0.396*** 0.179** 0.478*** 0.250***
(5.07) (2.17) (5.91) (3.62)
Other high educ     0.284*** 0.208** 0.267*** 0.174***
(3.42) (2.55) (3.26) (2.67)
A level 0.145** 0.136* 0.153** 0.085
(2.46) (1.88) (2.47) (1.46)
O level 0.119* -0.001 0.210*** 0.058
(1.79) (0.02) (3.18) (1.18)
Other educ 0.074 -0.026 0.113* 0.028
(1.14) (0.42) (1.69) (0.53)
Professional occupations -0.047 0.185* -0.059 0.190**
(0.65) (1.90) (0.92) (2.51)
Associate professional and technical -0.147** -0.146* -0.189*** -0.137**
(2.20) (1.74) (2.96) (2.04)
Administrative and secretarial -0.365*** -0.284*** -0.399*** -0.298***
(4.76) (3.57) (5.38) (4.73)
Skilled trades occupations -0.331*** -0.483*** -0.356*** -0.492***
(5.14) (3.51) (5.58) (4.50)
Personal service occupations -0.494*** -0.477*** -0.405*** -0.419***
(4.29) (5.51) (3.85) (5.92)
Sales and customer service occupation -0.424*** -0.390*** -0.428*** -0.397***
(4.47) (4.08) (4.45) (5.49)
Process, plant and machine operatives -0.462*** -0.501*** -0.504*** -0.546***
(7.00) (4.25) (7.86) (5.64)
Elementary occupations -0.588*** -0.544*** -0.570*** -0.535***
(8.79) (6.14) (8.59) (7.45)
Agriculture & fishing dummy -0.053 0.265 -0.067 0.197
(0.33) (1.09) (0.43) (1.18)
Energy & water dummy 0.423*** 0.401* 0.423*** 0.722***
(2.75) (1.89) (2.84) (3.61)
Manufacturing dummy 0.251*** 0.101 0.143 0.136
(2.89) (1.02) (1.56) (1.53)
Construction dummy 0.305*** 0.398 0.290*** 0.305*
(2.98) (1.38) (2.78) (1.83)
Distribution, hotels & restaurants dummy 0.124 -0.055 0.054 -0.046
(1.39) (0.66) (0.58) (0.59)
Transport & communication dummy 0.165* 0.002 0.176* 0.132
(1.68) (0.01) (1.77) (1.39)
Banking, finance & insurance dummy 0.274*** 0.124 0.289*** 0.166**
(3.02) (1.49) (3.05) (2.14)
Public admin, education & health dummy 0.188** 0.059 0.069 0.103
(2.16) (0.79) (0.75) (1.43)
Part-time -0.066 -0.061 0.021 -0.055*
(1.09) (1.51) (0.32) (1.65)
Small firm -0.098*** -0.106*** -0.153*** -0.131***
(2.60) (2.79) (3.97) (4.14)
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Temporary -0.110 -0.023 -0.015 0.003
(1.34) (0.31) (0.18) (0.05)
Social housing -0.058 -0.011 -0.106 -0.128*
(0.72) (0.15) (1.34) (1.84)
Owned -0.019 -0.021 -0.035 -0.083
(0.24) (0.26) (0.47) (1.18)
Mortgage 0.002 0.054 -0.003 -0.017
(0.03) (0.75) (0.05) (0.27)
Constant 1.513*** 2.029*** 1.457*** 2.137***
(6.69) (9.57) (6.31) (11.31)
Observations 597 560 639 705
R-squared 0.57 0.54 0.57 0.56
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3. Exclusion of controls for the nature of employment.
OLS Earnings
Male Female
Sheltered -0.156** -0.106*
(2.12) (1.70)
Assistance -0.031 0.115*
(0.40) (1.72)
Experience 0.029*** 0.027***
(6.67) (6.43)
Experience Sq -0.001*** -0.001***
(7.17) (6.00)
Tenure 0.002*** 0.002***
(5.27) (4.47)
Tenure Sq -0.000** -0.000
(2.13) (1.23)
Birth 0.050 0.000
(1.60) (0.00)
Work acc -0.100** 0.036
(2.08) (0.61)
Traffic acc -0.075 0.062
(1.13) (1.01)
Household acc -0.046 0.027
(0.88) (0.47)
Work illness -0.016 -0.014
(0.43) (0.31)
Duration <1 0.052 -0.061
(1.07) (1.34)
Duration <2 0.093** 0.003
(2.09) (0.08)
Duration <3 0.038 -0.095**
(0.89) (2.21)
Duration <5 0.036 0.014
(0.94) (0.39)
Duration <10 0.004 0.000
(0.11) (0.01)
Kind -0.058** 0.004
(1.98) (0.15)
Amount -0.052 -0.089***
(1.45) (2.69)
Mobility1 -0.136 -0.116
(1.55) (1.60)
Mobility2 0.016 -0.115***
(0.36) (2.91)
Number health -0.020* 0.004
(1.66) (0.42)
Limbs   -0.002 -0.034
(0.05) (0.91)
Sight/hearing -0.054 -0.111*
(0.92) (1.68)
Chest/heart -0.024 -0.027
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(0.58) (0.83)
Mental health -0.193*** -0.136**
(2.72) (2.19)
White 0.050 -0.002
(0.81) (0.04)
Single -0.027 0.002
(0.56) (0.04)
Married 0.060 -0.074**
(1.54) (2.44)
Degree 0.702*** 0.737***
(14.94) (16.14)
Other high educ     0.409*** 0.479***
(7.56) (10.39)
A level 0.208*** 0.246***
(5.00) (5.61)
O level 0.203*** 0.157***
(4.38) (4.14)
Other educ 0.047 0.010
(1.01) (0.25)
Social housing -0.231*** -0.109**
(4.11) (2.19)
Owned -0.055 -0.041
(1.04) (0.81)
Mortgage 0.015 0.057
(0.32) (1.31)
Constant 1.385*** 1.211***
(9.93) (9.58)
Observations 1553 1531
R-squared 0.41 0.39
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